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Recent Decisions
FIRST AMENDMENT TION RULE

REQUIRING

PRIOR RESTRAINT

PRIOR SUBMISSION

NEWSPAPERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

-

BOARD OF EDUCA-

OF PRIVATE

STUDENT

VAGUE AND OVERBROAD

Nitzberg v. Parks.'
In November 1973, school officials of Woodlawn Senior High School

in Baltimore County, Maryland, ordered two private student newspapers
to cease publication. Shortly thereafter student publishers of the papers
and their parents filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland2 against the Baltimore County Board of Education.
Plaintiffs alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 19833 that Rule No. 5130.1(b), the4
School Board's statement of "Students' Rights and Responsibilities,"
1. Civil No. 74-1839 (4th Cir., Apr. 14, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Nitzberg,
slip opinion]. The case proceeded on stipulated facts. The court of appeals noted
sua sponte, however, that the school threatened to suspend students if they produced
another issue of The Woodlawn Lampoon, in which an article had appeared describing
cheerleaders as "sex objects." School administrators regarded the article as "obscene"
and "demeaning" to the school. Nitzberg, slip opinion at 12 n.1.
2. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
4. Rule 5130.1, currently undergoing revision to conform with the decision in
Nitzberg, can be found in BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BALTIMORE COUNTY, STUDENT
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, POLICY 5130.1, (Dec. 12, 1974). Rule 5130.1(b) as
approved by the district court (see text preceding note 7 infra) is as follows:
Literature may be distributed and posted by the student of the subject school
in designated areas on school property as long as it is not obscene or libelous (as
defined below) and as long as the distribution of said literature does not reasonably lead the principal to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.
If a student desires to post or make a distribution of free literature which
is not officially recognized as a school publication, the student shall submit such
non-school material to the principal for review and prior approval. In exercising
this right of prior restraint, principals shall follow the procedures specified in
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authorized the prior restraint of non-school literature in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 5 The School Board
subsequently revised the rule, but on January 24, 1974, the district court
held the revised version vague and overbroad and gave the Board two
weeks to revise it. The court reviewed and rejected the resulting version
and on March 26 enjoined the Board from enforcing it. After reviewing
a fourth version, the court on May 17 continued the injunction and ordered
this policy. The principal shall render a decision within two (2) pupil days of
such submission. If this decision is in the negative, the principal shall state his
reasons to the student in writing. During this period of review, any supply of the
material may be retained by the student or may be left with the principal for
safekeeping. Distribution of such material during the review and appeal period,
or following a negative decision, shall be sufficient grounds for confiscation of
such material and suspension of the student by the principal. If a student is dissatisfied with the decision of the principal with respect to the distribution of a
non-school publication, the student may appeal this decision to the appropriate
area assistant superintendent who shall render a decision, stating his reasons
in writing, within three (3) pupil days of such appeal. If an administrator fails
to act within the time periods specified in this paragraph, the student(s) who
submitted the literature for review may distribute same. (Appeal from a decision
of an assistant superintendent is to the superintendent of schools and thence to
the Board of Education at the time of its next regularly scheduled meeting.)
The rule is quoted in Nitzberg, slip opinion at 3-4.
5. Generally speaking, a prior restraint is a governmental restriction imposed
upon speech, writings, or other forms of expression in advance of publication. The
Supreme Court first articulated the constitutional doctrine against prior restraints
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), although the doctrine had its beginnings
in the seventeenth century in England. The doctrine in the United States has its roots
in the strong constitutional protection afforded freedom of speech and press, and the
Court in Near formally recognized that first amendment protections necessarily include immunity from prior restraints on publication. For a discussion of the doctrine
and its history see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 648 (1955). The Court has held that any system of prior restraint comes
before it "bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Near, however, recognized the possibility of exceptions to the doctrine including, for example, restraints on wartime
communications, obscene publications, and "words that may have all the effect of
force," 283 U.S. at 716, quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 439 (1911). The Supreme Court has been most willing to recognize exceptions
to the doctrine in regard to the showing of motion pictures, Times Film Corp. v.
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), but only under strict procedural safeguards, including
prompt judicial resolution of the matter. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59
(1965). Recently the Court has recognized the validity of prior restraints in such
special environments as the military, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), and
prisons, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) ; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974). Cases involving the question of prior restraint of high school students' publications arose after the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), discussed at notes 14-16 and accompanying text infra, wherein the
Court recognized students' first amendment rights. The issues in the school cases
generally have been whether the school environment constitutes an exception to the
general proscription of prior restraints, and, if so, whether the particular regulations
impose a procedurally valid and minimally restrictive system of prior restraint upon
private student publications.
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yet another revision. On May 30, the court approved this version and
dissolved the injunction. The students and their parents appealed. 6
In an opinion written by Justice Clark, 7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held the regulation,
even as revised, void for vagueness and overbreadth because it lacked
precise definitions of terminology. 8 In addition, the court found that the
Baltimore County rule failed to provide procedural safeguards as required
under the Constitution by two previous Fourth Circuit cases, Quarterman
v. Byrd9 and Baughman v. Freienmuth.10 Citing the recent Supreme Court
6. Nitzberg, slip opinion at 2-3.
7. Retired Justice Clark was sitting by designation, Nitzberg, slip opinion at 1.
8. Nitzberg, slip opinion at 7. The court noted deficiencies in the rule's definitions of obscenity and libel. The rule's definition of obscenity is as follows:
Obscene or obscenity The average person, applying contemporary community standards would find
that it, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest; it depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct currently defined by Maryland law
[Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 416-17 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975)]. Taken
as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. The
Supreme Court has set forth the following examples of what types of materials
can be prohibited as obscene:
"(a) Patently offensive representations of descriptions of ultimate sex acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Miller v. California, [413
U.S. 15, 25 (1973)]. These examples are adopted herewith as part of this policy.
Nitzberg, slip opinion at 13 n.2. The definition was an attempt to conform to the
guidelines of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For a discussion of the difficulties in applying the Miller standard see Note, Obscenity '73: Something Old, A
Little Bit New, Quite a Bit Borrowed, But Nothing Blue, 33 MD. L. REV. 421 (1973).
The court also pointed out a failure to apply the libel standard set forth in
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and the cases following it. Nitzberg,
slip opinion at 7. The School Board's definition of libel or libelous material is
as follows:
[A] written or oral statement about . . . a person which is made with "actual
malice," that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity,
is subject to sanction and is not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. A statement is libelous and not protected by the First Amendment if it
is made with "actual malice" and if it tends to expose one to public hatred, shame,
obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation,
or disgrace, or if it induces an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking
persons, or if it causes one to be shunned and avoided in society.
Id. at 12 n.3. The definition apparently fails in its attempt at all-inclusiveness. For
a comment regarding the difficulty experienced even by lawyers and judges when
confronted by terms of art such as obscenity and libel, see Judge Craven's opinion
in Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350 (4th Cir. 1973). See also note 60
and accompanying text infra.
9. 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 23-26 and accompanying
text infra.
10. 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 27-30
infra. Although the Baltimore County regulation spoke in terms of the maximum
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decision in Goss v. Lopez, 1 the court held further that Rule 5130.1(b)
failed to provide the student with the right to confrontation and a hearing
2
required by due process before a student can be suspended.1
In addition to the rule's procedural and definitional deficiencies, the
court found that it lacked criteria for guiding school administrators in
predicting the occurrence of such disruptions as would justify the restraint of distribution of private student publications. 3 Justice Clark
noted that the rule attempted but failed to conform to the implication left
by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,14 that

prior restraint of student publications might be justified under certain
circumstances. Ruling that the wearing of black armbands by elementary
and secondary school children in protest of the Vietnam War was akin to
"pure speech," the Tinker Court said that such conduct could be banned
only in the presence of "facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference

with school activities.'

15

In so holding, the Court noted that first amend-

number of "pupil days" allowed for the principal's decision, the court pointed out
that "pupil days" was nowhere defined and that no maximum time was specified for
an appeal to the superintendent or for ultimate review by the School Board, such
appeal being provided for only "at the time of its next regularly scheduled meeting."
Nitzberg, slip opinion at 8. The court followed its holding in Baughman that school
regulations must contain precise, objective standards by which to judge submitted
material, including the following:
(c) Such prior restraints must contain precise criteria sufficiently spelling out
what is forbidden so that a reasonably intelligent student will know what he may
write and what he may not write.
(d) A prior restraint system, even though precisely defining what may not be
written, is nevertheless invalid unless it provides for:
(1) A definition of "Distribution" and its application to different kinds
of material;
(2) Prompt approval or disapproval of what is submitted;
(3) Specification of the effect of failure to act promptly; and
(4) An adequate and prompt appeals procedure.
478 F.2d at 1351. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
11. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
12. Nitzberg, slip opinion at 8-9. Rule 5130.1 provided suspension as a penalty
for distribution of materials during the period in which they were under review or
after a negative decision. The school had in fact threatened to use the suspension
power in the instant case. See note 1 supra.
13. Nitzberg, slip opinion at 7.
14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15. Id. at 514 (emphasis added). Tinker adopted the test formulated in Burnside
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), which held that regulations forbidding the
wearing of "freedom buttons" in school were unconstitutional infringements upon the
students' rights of free expression "where the exercise of such rights in the school
buildings . . . does not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." 363 F2d at 749. But see Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), decided the same
day as Burnside. The court found that school authorities acted to protect a "legitimate
and substantial interest in the orderly conduct of the school," id. at 754, in forbidding
the wearing of buttons similar to those in Burnside, but where the "activity created
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ment rights for teachers and students do not disappear when they enter
the school house but that the right to free expression must be applied "in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment."' 6
Since Tinker, five circuits, including the Fourth, have attempted to
apply the Tinker "reasonable forecast-material and substantial disruption"
test to student publication cases. 17 In each case the court was called upon
to examine the validity of a school regulation requiring review of private
student publications by the school principal before distribution; in each
case the court held the regulation before it invalid. In reaching such
similar results, however, the courts have found themselves awash "in the
choppy waters left by Tinker,"' 8 unsure of the precise extent of the first
amendment rights granted to students by the Tinker 9 decision and
unclear about the application of the Tinker rule both to requirements of
prior review in general and to grounds for restraining distribution in
a state of confusion, disrupted class instruction and resulted in a general breakdown
of orderly discipline ...." Id. at 751.
16. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Tinker marked the first time the Court specifically
extended the protection of the first amendment to high school students.
Prior to Tinker, however, the Supreme Court had on several occasions dealt
with the right of freedom of expression in the schools. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), decided before the first amendment was applied to the states, the
Court held that a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of any subject in a language
other than English to those who had not passed the eighth grade was arbitrary and
unreasonable. In West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court struck
down on first and fourteenth amendment grounds a state regulation requiring public
school children to salute the American flag but did so in general terms without indicating how extensive first amendment rights for school children were. In Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968), Justice Fortas, writing for the majority as he
did in Tinker, found an Arkansas anti-evolution statute unconstitutional but did so
as an impermissible establishment of religion, declining the opportunity to broaden the
decision to include freedom of speech questions. See also Friedman v. Union Free
School Dist., 314 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp.
102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; note 5 supra.
17. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) ; Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Fujishima v. Board of Educ.,
460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971);
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Riseman v. School
Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (lst Cir. 1971).
For arguments that Tinker should not be applied in cases involving prior
restraints of private student newspapers, see Haskell, Student Expression in the
Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEO. L.J. 37 (1970), and Nahmod, Black
Arm Bands and Underground Newspapers: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools,
51 CHI. B. REc. 144 (1969).
18. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 1971).
19. See Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969), in which he disapproves of what he perceives to be
the Court's "uncritical assumption" that the first amendment rights of children are
co-extensive with those of adults. It seems unlikely, however, that the Court was
recognizing rights as broad as Justice Stewart feared; on the contrary, the Court
apparently recognized that means of expression in the public schools could sometimes
be limited to prevent disruption. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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particular. The Supreme Court in Tinker had merely hinted at the kinds
of activities which would allow the imposition of restraints, noting for
example, that there had been no "threats or acts of violence on school
premises" and that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
'20
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.
2
The Fourth Circuit, in line with all but one ' of the circuits 22 which
have faced the issue, has held that the requirement of submission and
review before distribution is not per se unconstitutional. In Quarterman
v. Byrd23 the court recognized that although such a requirement itself
constitutes a form of prior restraint upon the student's exercise of free
24
speech, it can be justified by considerations of age and level of maturity.
What made the school regulation in Quarterman invalid, according to the
court, was its lack of procedural safeguards in the form of a speedy review
of rulings against the student.2 5 The court also noted the absence in the
regulation of any criteria to guide school authorities in predicting those
disturbances which would justify restraint, but it offered no guidelines
to aid them in so determining except a reference to the ruling in Tinker
as a "reasonable criterion. ' 26 Two years later, in Baughman v. Freienmuth,27 the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to extend its holding in
Quarterman to prohibit all prior restraints of student publications, including the requirement of submission for review before distribution, but the
court declined to do so. 28 Instead it again found the school rule in ques-

20. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). For a discussion of the Burnside "material disruption" test adopted by the Court in Tinker see note 15 and accompanying text supra.
21. The exception is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972), discussed at notes 37-44 and accompanying
text infra.
22. In line with the Fourth Circuit are Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist.,
462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d
Cir. 1971) ; Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971).
23. 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971). In Quarterman, a student in a North Carolina
high school received two ten-day suspensions for distributing an underground newspaper in violation of a school rule that prohibited such distribution without permission of the principal.
24. Id. at 57. See also note 19 and accompanying text supra.
25. 453 F.2d at 59. The regulations in question were General School Rules 7
and 8 of Pine Forest High School:
7. Each pupil is specifically prohibited from distributing, while under school
jurisdiction, any advertisements, pamphlets, printed material, written material,
announcements or other paraphernalia without the express permission of the
principal of the school.
8. All students shall be subject to suspension or dismissal by the principal, who
willfully and persistently violate the rules of the school, or who may be guilty
of immoral or disreputable conduct ...
Id. at 55. See also Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
26. 453 F.2d at 60. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
27. 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
28. Id. But see Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972),
discussed at text accompanying notes 37-44 infra.
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tion constitutionally impermissible because it lacked specific procedural
safeguards. 2 The Baughman court cited the Tinker decision but never
reached the problem of defining the circumstances in which a school
administrator would be justified in restraining distribution. 0
Nor have the decisions in the other circuits offered much clarification of Tinker. In the leading circuit court decision on the issue, Eisner
v. Stamford Board of Education,8' the Second Circuit delegated to school
officials the task of defining a "reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption," expressing confidence that authorities "would never
contemplate the futile as well as unconstitutional suppression of matter
that would create only an immaterial disturbance. " 3' 2 The Fifth Circuit
in Shanley v. Northeast Independent School District

3

was less willing

to give school authorities such broad discretion and noted that the school
board bore the heavy burden of showing the reasonableness of restraining
distribution where the publication in question was not obscene, libelous,
or inflammatory.3 4 The Shanley court reasoned that disruption in fact
was an important element to be considered in applying the Tinker test.3 5
Both the Eisner and Shanley courts invalidated the school rules before
36
them on grounds of procedural inadequacies, however, and neither explored further the question still open under the Tinker decision: what
are the grounds for a "reasonable forecast" by school officials of disruption such that distribution may be restrained?
Of the five circuits which have considered the issue, only the Seventh
Circuit, in Fujishima v. Board of Education,3 7 has held the requirement
of prior review itself unconstitutional simply because it is a form of prior
restraint. Such a conclusion is compelled, the court reasoned, 3s by considering together the Supreme Court's decisions in Tinker and in Near
29. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973). See note 10
and accompanying text supra.
30. 478 F.2d at 1348-49. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
31. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971). Eisner was cited with approval in Quarternman
v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 (4th Cir. 1971), and Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist.,
462 F.2d 960, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1972). Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355,
1358 (7th Cir. 1972), distinguished at length its view from that of the Eisner court.
32. 440 F.2d at 808.
33. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 971. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
35. 462 F.2d at 970. In this sense, the Shanley court may have been close to the
Fujishima court's view that restraint is not permissible until disruption has occurred.
See text accompanying notes 42-43 infra.
36. Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist., 462 F.2d at 977 (5th Cir. 1972) and
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d at 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971). The Fifth Circuit
also found the regulation before it void for vagueness and overbreadth. 462 F.2d at 975.
While the Second Circuit did not find the Board's policy statement overbroad or
unconstitutionally vague, the court did admit that the policy would be helped by some
"refinements." 440 F.2d at 809.
37. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 1357.
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v. Minnesota,8 9 the Court's landmark decision on prior restraints. 40 The
Fujishima court considered the Tinker rule an inappropriate rationale for
requiring that students submit publications to school authorities for review before distribution. 4 1 Furthermore, the court apparently did not
accept the Tinker rule as a proper test for deciding when distribution
could be restrained, but found it more properly a formula for determining
42
when students could be punished for activities involving expression.
That is, the mere expectation of material and substantial disruptions does
not justify prior restraint; rather, the occurrence of disruption is a ground
for punishment and for restraint of further disruption-causing activity.
Thus, the court pointed out that Tinker dealt with the question of constitutional limitations upon the restraint of existing conduct - the wearing
of black armbands - and that in this context, the use of the word "forecast" meant a prediction that such conduct, if continued, would lead to disruption of school activities. 48 The Fujishima court was willing to approve
44
only reasonable rules regulating time, place, and manner of distribution.
At present the other circuits have given no indication that they will
move toward the Fujishima view that any school regulation requiring
prior review of private student publications is an unconstitutional prior restraint. 45 In fact, the continued authority of the Fujishima decision in
the Seventh Circuit seems to have been called into question by that circuit's later decision in Jacobs v. Board of School Commissioners,40 with
39. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
40. See Note, PriorRestraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325 (1973)
note 5 supra.
41. 460 F.2d 1358. See also Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F2d 10 (7th Cir.
1970).
42. 460 F.2d at 1358. Cf. Norton v. Discipline Comm., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970) (court of appeals upheld district court's
denial of relief to university students who had been suspended after distribution
of private newspaper).
43. 460 F.2d at 1358.
44. Id. at 1359. See Note, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE
L.J. 1325, 1334 (1973). See also Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F2d 148, 150 (1st
Cir. 1971), where, in a per curiam decision invalidating the school regulation before
it, the court left unclear whether it would allow forms of prior restraints other than
those regulating time, place, and manner of distribution.
45. The courts may, however, come to view Fujishinta as one solution to the
problems they may ultimately face in defining further the Tinker rule. See text
accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
46. 490 F2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). The
Jacobs court was clearly aware of the Fujishima case, decided one year earlier,
because it cited Fujishima in its discussion of whether the school publication before
it was obscene. 490 F2d at 610. The Jacobs court chose to find the school rule
before it void for vagueness and overbreadth despite Fujishima's clear holding that
any school rule requiring prior submission, no matter how precisely and narrowly
drawn, is an "unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the first amendment."
460 F.2d at 1357. See notes 37-44 and accompanying text supra. Had the Jacobs
court followed the Fujishima holding, it would not have been necessary to reach the
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the apparent result that the Seventh Circuit has joined the others in their
view that Tinker sanctions restraints upon free expression in the high
47
school environment which might not be acceptable in other contexts.
The problem is that despite reading Tinker to permit certain restraints,
these courts uniformly invalidated every prior restraint system confronting them. Baltimore County's Rule 5130.1(b), after four revisions, was
more specific in its definitions and procedural aspects than the school
regulations scrutinized in other circuit court opinions, 48 yet it was held
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Nitzberg opinion was apparently written with the purpose of providing guidelines for school officials
to use in drafting a constitutionally acceptable rule, and the concomitant
purpose of keeping the issue out of the courts. 49 Following its previous
decisions in Quarterman v. Byrd"° and Baughman v. Freienmuth,51 however, the court concentrated its review upon the procedural inadequacies
of Rule 5130.1(b) and the remedies for those shortcomings. In so doing,
the court confronted only partially the issues which arise from its acceptance of the Tinker conclusion' that prior restraints upon student publications *are permissible in certain circumstances; it outlined procedures for
a system of prior submission and review which apparently satisfy the
procedural requirements of due process but it did not provide satisfactory
guidelines for determining, given a constitutionally acceptable procedure,
when the distribution of a publication may be constitutionally restrained.
The court pointed out that the mere repetition of the Tinker language in
the School Board's regulation left that, and any, regulation impermissibly
questions of vagueness and overbreadth. It is noteworthy, however, that the Jacobs
case was decided by three different judges from those on the Fujishima panel, and,
therefore, the view of the Seventh Circuit may remain unclear until the issue is heard

en banc in some future case.
47. See also Schwartz v. Shuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 242 (C.D.N.Y. 1969).
48. Compare Nitzberg, slip opinion at 3-4, with Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478
F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist., 462 F.2d
960, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1356 (7th
Cir. 1972) ; Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 55 (4th Cir. 1971) ; Eisner v. Stamford
Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1971).
49. This approach persuaded an obviously troubled Senior Circuit Judge Bryan
to concur in the opinion:
I have had considerable difficulty with this case because of the problems
logically arising in the conflict between the effectuation of the school authorities'
bona fide aim and the restrictions of the First Amendment. . . .I concur in the
present opinion of the Court because it provides a clear and explicit chart by which
the District Court and the Board may achieve their object and yet not trample
upon the students' First Amendment privileges.
Nitcberg, slip opinion at 15. It remains problematical, however, whether these guidelines will satisfy school officials, who would be required to fulfill strict procedural
and reasonableness requirements, or students, who are nonetheless still required to
submit their publications for prior approval, or the courts, who are faced with the
undefined limits of the Tinker test. See text accompanying notes 50-61 infra.
50. 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
51. 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
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vague. Quoting Jacobs -z. Board of School Commissioners,52 the court
noted:
It does not at all follow that the phrasing of a constitutional standard
by which to decide whether a regulation infringes upon rights protected by the first amendment is sufficiently specific in a regulation to
convey notice to students or people in general of what is prohibited. 53
Rather than explain what would be necessary to make a regulation "sufficiently specific," the court evinced an intent to leave the resolution of
54
such constitutional issues to the School Board.
This willingness to leave to school officials what the court characterized as the "many difficult questions precipitated by prior restraint of
student publications," 55 although understandable in light of the court's
reluctance to interfere with the internal disciplinary procedures of the
schools, 56 will not operate to settle the constitutional questions still unanswered nor to keep them out of the courts. Up to now the courts have
been able to void the rules before them on procedural due process grounds.5 7
Assuming, however, that a school regulation can be written to include
the procedural safeguards required by Nitzberg58 and the other circuit
court decisions, 59 the courts may be forced to acknowledge that due process
requirements have been satisfied and that the sole constitutional question
to be answered is whether or not the regulation conforms to the demands
of the Tinker test. It seems inevitable, therefore, that the federal courts
will be faced with the task of spelling out as painstakingly the requirements of the Tinker rule as they have the requirements of procedural due
52. 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
53. Nitzberg, slip opinion at 7, quoting 490 F2d at 605. Despite the similarity of
the language in the Jacobs regulation to that of the standard promulgated in the Tinker
decision, the Jacobs court held the regulation void for vagueness, citing Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 490 F2d at 605 n.2. The court noted that violation
of the rules in question carried severe penalties, "mandat[ing] careful scrutiny for
vagueness" to avoid "the substantial danger of inadequate warnings to students, or
arbitrary enforcement by teachers and principals, and of inhibition of full exercise of
students' first amendment rights." 490 F.2d at 605.
54. Justice Clark suggested that the question be turned over to a student-faculty
committee, Nitzberg, slip opinion at 11. He observed that such a procedure, along
with other suggestions outlined in the decision may work to "ameliorate the relationship between the student and the disciplinarian and lead them to empathize with each
other." Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 11.
56. The Fourth Circuit pointed out, with some distress, that Nitzberg marked
the third time it had been called upon to rule on first amendment aspects of public
school regulations, and reiterated the view it had expressed in Quarterman: the
policy of the federal courts has been to remain apart from the routine operational
conflicts of the schools and to intervene only when the threat to constitutional rights is
clear-cut. Id. at 9.
57. See notes 10, 36 and accompanying text supra.
58. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 22 supra.
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process. They will have to define "material and substantial disruptions"
and identify those factors which will enable a "reasonable forecast" of
such disruptions. The potential frustration in this kind of analysis could
lead courts to the adoption of the Fujishima view that no form of prior
restraint is permissible ;6o at the least, it would clarify for school authorities the mandate of Tinker, which, despite permitting some restraints,
grants extensive first amendment rights to high school students, rights
not subject to limitations merely to prevent embarrassment or discomfiture
to school authorities.61
60. It is likely that defining "substantial disruption" in a constitutionally acceptable manner will present difficulties similar to those encountered in defining
obscenity and libel. See note 8 and text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. Perhaps
the best approach to the problem, therefore, is to avoid the definitional quagmire
altogether by prohibiting all prior restraint of student expression and permitting only
the punishment of disruptive conduct. This solution is, of course, the Fujishima
holding. See notes 37-44 and accompanying text supra. In Fujishima, however, the
court reached this result for the constitutional reason that any prior restraint of
student publications is impermissible, whereas what is suggested here is that the same
result may be inevitable for pragmatic reasons even if not constitutionally mandated.
That is, assuming Fujishima is wrong and Tinker does permit some prior restraint,
the difficulties involved in drafting a constitutionally acceptable scheme of such
restraint may be insurmountable. Cf. Bright v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.,
124 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1975) (students may be held liable for distribution of libelous
materials but such distributions not subject to prior review, noting, inter alia, difficulty
of definition).
61. See Tinker

v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.

503, 509

(1969).

N.B. On September 25, 1975, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland denied a request by the American Civil Liberties Union for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Baltimore County school officials from exercising pre-publication censorship of student newspapers and other materials. The court found the
request unnecessary since the Baltimore County Board of Education had suspended
enforcement of any regulations providing for prior restraint of student publications
until the county and the ACLU reached agreement on the text of a draft regulation.
The [Baltimore] Sun, Sept. 26, 1975, § C, at 1, col. 5. The district court reacquired
jurisdiction in Nitaberg through the court of appeals' order to implement its decision
through "appropriate action." Nitaberg, slip opinion at 11.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HORSE

DUE PROCESS LICENSE OF RACE
TRAINER MAY BE SUSPENDED PRIOR TO HEARING Hubd

v. West Virginia Racing Commission.'
The thoroughbred race horse Morning Ground, owned and trained
by Richard L. Hubel, won the third race at Waterford Park, Wheeling
Downs, West Virginia. After the race, the stewards 2 at Waterford Park
summarily determined that Hubel had violated West Virginia Rules of
Racing 7933 and 795(b), 4 which provide that a trainer is the "absolute
insurer" against impermissible medication of his race horse. Consequently,
on May 23, 1973, the stewards issued an order suspending Hubel's owner's
and trainer's permits for a forty-seven day period.5 Hubel appealed the
1. 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975).
2. The stewards are officials designated to represent the authority of the State
Racing Commission at a track on a racing day. They are generally granted broad
authority to determine infractions of the rules and to punish offenders. See W. Va.
Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 140-45 (1972). This has been held
to be a permissible delegation of authority. Porter v. Eyster, 294 F.2d 613, 618 (4th
Cir. 1961).
3. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 793 (1972):
The trainer shall be the absolute insurer of and responsible for the condition of
the horse entered in a race, regardless of the acts of third parties. Should . . .
tests prove positive showing the presence of any [proscribed drug] the trainer of
the horse may have . . . the following penalties inflicted - be fined, be suspended,
his license revoked . . . and in addition the owner of the horse . . . may have
[the same] penalties inflicted ....
[Amendments to the West Virginia Rules of Racing enacted subsequent to plaintiff's
suspension are indicated only where relevant.]
4. Id., R. 795(b) :
Should the analysis of any ... sample taken from any horse show the presence
of any substance, other than the prohibited drugs set forth in Rule 793 which is
the result of any . . . medication which has not been prescribed, administered or
dispensed by a licensed veterinarian, the trainer and any other person shown to
have had the care of or attendance of the horse may be fined or his license suspended or both.
5. The stewards acted pursuant to W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23,
ser. 1, R. 802 (1972), which provides:
A majority of the Stewards at any horse race meeting may suspend a license and
such suspension or revocation shall be effective immediately. The Stewards shall,
as soon as thereafter practicable, make and enter an order to that effect and serve
a copy thereof on the license holder . . . . Such order shall state the grounds
for the action taken.
In the order suspending his permits, the stewards also denied Hubel access to the
Waterford Park Race Track for the same period and disqualified Morning Ground
from the purse he had won on May 7.
Because of the stewards' action, Hubel was suspended in other states where
he was licensed. 513 F.2d at 242 n.4. See, e.g., Md. Agency Rules & Reg., Racing
Comm'n R. 09.10.56.18, (as amended 1973) (Racing Commission may suspend and
licensee charged with violation of the racing rules of another jurisdiction).
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stewards' decision to the West Virginia Racing Commission6 and moved
for a stay of suspension pending his appeal. The Commission denied the
7
stay, pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Racing 804.
Hubel filed suit8 against the Racing Commission in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia 9 on June 18,

1973. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that rule 804 violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment 0 by denying the trainer notice
6. Hubel exercised a right guaranteed by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-23-16(c)

(1971), which states:
Any person adversely affected by any such order shall be entitled to a hearing
thereon if, within twenty days after service of a copy thereof . . . such person
files with the racing commission a written demand for such hearing ....
This provision is embodied in W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1,
R. 803 (1972), which provides:
Any person or persons penalized or disciplined under the laws of the State of
West Virginia or under these rules . . . may request a hearing before the Commission. The request for hearing must be received by the Commission at its office
in Charleston within twenty (20) days after receipt of a written order of suspension or revocation....
Rule of Racing 805 governs the Commission's response to such a request:
Upon receipt of the written demand for such hearing, . . . a time and place not
less than ten (10) nor more than thirty (30) days thereafter will be set by the
Commission. Any scheduled hearing may be continued by the Racing Commission
upon its own motion or for good cause shown by the person demanding the hearing.
7. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 804 (1972): "An
appeal from a decision of a Racing Official . . . shall not affect such decision until
the appeal has been acted upon by the Commission." The same rule is provided by
statute, in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-23-16(c) (1971):
A demand for hearing shall operate automatically to stay or suspend the execution of any order suspending or revoking a license, but a demand for hearing shall
not operate to stay or suspend the execution of any order suspending or revoking
a permit.
In the West Virginia statutes, the term "license" refers to authorization by the Commission of an association which conducts horse races (e.g., of a race track) ; the term
"permit" denotes authorization of all other participants in racing, including owners
and trainers. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-23-1 to -2, -3(8) to -3(9) (1971). The
racing rules make no such distinction. Any possible confusion is not relevant here,
because rule 804 and the statute set out above are consistent with respect to their use of
the word "permit."
8. Joined as co-plaintiff was the Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Association, a body claiming to represent "the rights and interests of thoroughbred horsemen collectively." 513 F.2d at 242.
9. The district court's jurisdiction was secured under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970),
which gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil cases involving
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. ."
The plaintiffs also sought a mandatory injunction against the suspension of
the permits pending a ruling by the Commission, but this prayer was abandoned when
the suspension expired before the district court had acted on the case. This obviated
the need for a three-judge panel. 513 F.2d at 242, citing Mitchell v. Donovan, 398
U.S. 427 (1970), and Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649, 651-52 & n.2 (2d Cir.
1972), aff'd 410 U.S. 752, rehearing denied 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
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and a hearing before suspension of his permit. Granting the defendant's
motion to dismiss,"' the district court held that the summary suspension
was justified as an exercise of police power, 12 and that the right of subsequent hearing, which was guaranteed by rule 805,13 provided Hubel
with a procedural safeguard sufficient to comply with the due process
clause. 14 On Hubel's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed.
At the appellate level, it was not contested that Hubel's permits embodied a "property right" of the sort that is protected by the fourteenth
amendment ;15 therefore, there was no question that the State was bound
to comply with the requirements of procedural due process in suspending
or revoking the permits. Furthermore, it was conceded that in the context of this case, procedural due process "require[d] that Hubel be given
notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to defend his interest . ..

."16

The

court of appeals was presented with one narrow constitutional issue:
whether due process also required that Hubel be granted notice and a
11. Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. W. Va.
1974). The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). 376 F. Supp. at 3.
12. 376 F. Supp. at 5-6.
13. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 805 (1972). The text
of the rule is given in note 6 supra.
14. 376 F. Supp. at 5.
15. 513 F.2d at 242. It is not surprising that this point was uncontested. The
Supreme Court has often included rights which exist by statutory entitlement within
the scope of due process protection. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(public education); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). (driver's license which was
essential to licensee's occupation) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare
payments). Furthermore, the Court has recognized the importance of an individual's
interest in his chosen occupation. Bell v. Burson, supra at 538; Willner v. Committee
on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1963) (applicant for admission to the
bar entitled to hearing before rejection on basis of alleged inadequate character);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (statutory criteria
for bar applicants must be applied in accordance with due process). Although it is
difficult to delimit the interests which will be considered "property rights" within the
meaning of the due process clause, the Court's discussion in Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), provides useful guidelines.: The basic requirement is
that the holder must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the interest, because
the concept of property exists to "protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives .... ." Id. Together, these decisions leave little doubt that a license to
pursue a profession should be considered a property right.
16. 513 F.2d at 242. The Supreme Court has often stated that procedural due
process usually requires notice and opportunity to be heard at some point before a final
deprivation of a protected property right. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974)
(dictum); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). There have, however, been cases which indicate
that this is not an absolute rule. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1973); Cafeteria
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). See text accompanying notes
43-47 infra.
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hearing before the suspension could take effect. Rule 804,17 which on its
face compelled the Racing Commission to deny a stay of suspension pending appeal, was attacked as the unconstitutional element in the procedural
system. The Fourth Circuit concluded that a prior hearing was not required and upheld rule 804.
The circuit court's analysis of this issue rested almost entirely on its
reading of Goss v. Lopez.18 In Goss, the Supreme Court used a traditional
approach to procedural due process in evaluating an attack on high school
disciplinary procedures. The Court acknowledged that due process is a
flexible concept, and that the validity of a procedural system must be
tested by weighing the importance of the particular interests involved. 19
Balancing the interests of the school administration in maintaining order
against the interests of the student in obtaining an education, the Court
held that due process normally requires notice of the charges and a hearing prior to a suspension. 20 However, the Court recognized an exception:
a potentially dangerous or disruptive student could be removed from
21
school without prior notice and before the hearing.
In Hubel, the court of appeals cited Goss for its affirmation of the
traditional approach to procedural due process.2 2 The court identified the
State's interests as protecting the health of horses and maintaining the
purity of the sport. It held that those interests outweighed Hubel's
"normal . . .right to notice and hearing before . . . sanctions [were]
applied, '23 so that summary suspension of his permit was justified. The
17. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 804 (1972). The text
of the rule isgiven innote 7 supra.
18. 419 U.S.565 (1975).
19. The Court inGoss noted:
[T]he interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely
practical matters and . . . "[tihe very nature of due process negates any concept
of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."
Cafeteria Workers v.McElroy, 367 U.S. 895 (1961) ...
[Tihe timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing
will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved.
419 U.S. at 578-79, quoted, in part, with approval, Hubel v.West Virginia Racing
Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1975).
20. 419 U.S.at 582.
21. The exception was described as follows:
[T]here are recurring situations inwhich prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or
property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary
hearing should follow as soon as practicable ....
419 U.S. at 582-83, quoted with approval, Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n,
513 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1975).
22. See note 19 supra.
23. 513 F.2d at 243. The court of appeals stated:
[The State] has a humanitarian interest in protecting the health of the horse, and
ithas a broader and more weighty interest in protecting the purity of the sport,
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court relied heavily upon the exception allowed in Goss, and stated that
the State's interests must prevail because a trainer of an impermissibly
medicated horse represents a "continuing danger" 24 of the sort for which
the exception was allowed. The court of appeals supported this conclusion
by citing a prior Fourth Circuit decision, Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association.25 In that case, a medical board and the staff
of a hospital suspended a doctor's "staff privileges" upon strong evidence
of serious professional irresponsibility, and the doctor withdrew in protest
from a hearing on the charges. The Fourth Circuit held that those circumstances justified a suspension without prior hearing.2 6 The Hubel
court identified the potential "continuing danger" posed by the physician

27
as a controlling concern in Christhilf.

The Supreme Court's approach to the issue presented in Hubel has
been fairly uniform. The purpose of procedural due process is to guard
against unreasonable or unfair government action, or to strike a balance
between protection of individual rights and legitimate government interests.
Whether a particular procedural system is obedient to that purpose cannot be determined except in context. The Court's approach has therefore
been flexible, with close attention to the nature of the interests involved
and the effects of the procedures.2 8
The Court has usually required that notice and a hearing be granted
to any person who is deprived of a property right by the government, and
that the notice and hearing be granted "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." 29 However, what constitutes a "meaningful time"
for the hearing is a separate question, to be considered within the context
of each case. The Court has analyzed the issue by precisely identifying
the competiing interests involved and then weighing them against each
both from the standpoint of protecting its own substantial revenues derived from
taxes. . . and protecting patrons of the sport from being defrauded. Collectively,
these interests, we think, justify the severe penalty [imposed].
24. Id. The Fourth Circuit derived this phrase from Goss, as quoted at note 21
supra.
25. 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974), reviewed, 32 WASH. &

LEE

L. REv. 446 (1974).

26. 496 F.2d at 180.
27. 513 F.2d at 243.
28. A succinct expression of the Court's general approach is found in Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 160-65 (1951).
"[B]y 'due process' is meant [a process] which, following the forms of law, is
appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be affected." Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708.
"[Dlue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . It is a process.
Id. at 162-63.
29. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
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other. 30 In many cases, the Court has held that the state's interests were
not strong enough to allow deprivation to precede hearing.3 ' However,
there have been significant exceptions where a particularly pressing public
2
interest justified postponement of notice and hearing.

30. In Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Court
delineated the first step in the process:
[W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.
Id. at 895, quoted with approval, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
Once the important factors have been identified, the process is one of balancing the competing interests, in light of all relevant circumstances. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975), quoted, note 19 supra; North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389
(1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 261-66; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 53942 (1971).
The Supreme Court has adopted a broad approach, weighing the effect of all
relevant circumstances on the balance; it is therefore difficult to generalize what
factors will be decisive. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 264 (immediate and
desperate need of welfare-dependent person is of crucial importance when considering
procedures for termination of benefits) ; Stanley v. Illinois, supra at 651 (when considering procedures involving child custody, the importance of the family as a social
unit is emphasized). The analysis allows the flexibility needed to achieve fair results
in the myriad of circumstances to which due process is applicable.
This approach was recently questioned in Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing,"
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975). Judge Friendly criticized the balancing test as
"uncertain and subjective," and advocated that a more precise method of analysis
be adopted, in order to "produce more principled and predictable decisions." Id. at
1278. He argued for curtailment of the trend toward extension of judicially-mandated
procedural protection.
The crucial importance of the factual context of the individual case is perhaps
best illustrated by the current uncertainty of the Court's position in the area of
creditor's remedies. Compare Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), with
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), and Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See note 41 infra.
31. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
82, 88-93 (1972) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
32. It has been stated that "[tihese situations . . . must be truly unusual. Only
in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity
for a prior hearing." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (seizure
of boat used in transportation of controlled substances); Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of misbranded drugs) ; Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947) (seizure of control of a bank after it failed) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (collection of internal revenue) ; Central Union Trust
Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (seizure of alien property in wartime); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of contaminated food). But see cases discussed in notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra.
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The court of appeals in Hubel cited Goss for concepts which are
central to the Supreme Court's approach,33 but did not complete the traditional analysis. It identified and discussed two valid purposes which the
state serves by attempting to deter the "doping" of race horses: protection
of horses from the potentially cruel effects of illicit drugs and protection
of the interests of the racing public in the purity of the sport.3 4 However,
it did not consider the competing concern of the individual trainer: his
right to earn a living in his chosen manner. The court appeared to balance
the trainer's "normal... right to notice and a hearing before ... sanctions
are applied"35 against the state's interests. In Goss and the other Supreme
Court cases, it was the threatened property right 8 which was weighed
against the state's interests, and the individual's procedural rights were
determined as a result of the balancing. Thus the court shifted the focus
of the analysis significantly. The usual emphasis on the balancing of competing substantive rights was lost completely, and the court instead sought
to determine whether the governmental purpose, considered alone, would
justify the procedure.
The court of appeals found justification for its unusual approach in
the "continuing danger" exception allowed in Goss. Because of the significance it attached to that exception, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Goss
as more than a re-affirmation of the traditional analysis. The court stated
that the State's interests must prevail "because" the trainer represented
a "continuing danger" analogous to that posed by a violent student in Goss
and an irresponsible doctor in Christhilf.3 7 This seems to have been the
actual basis of the decision in Hubel.38 The validity of the analogy is
subject to question. The threat posed by a trainer of a drugged race horse
does not evoke the same degree of urgency as that posed by an extremely
disruptive student or an irresponsible doctor. But it is more significant
that the court apparently used the "continuing danger" concept as a separate rule which obviated the need for a complete balancing analysis. The
33. See note 19 supra.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. 513 F.2d at 243.
36. In Goss, for example, the Supreme Court recognized that "[the student's
interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process, with
all of its unfortunate consequences." 419 U.S. at 579.
37. 513 F.2d at 243.
38. After stating that the State's interests must prevail because the trainer represented a "continuing danger," the court merely elaborated upon the significance of
those interests. The language of the final paragraph supports the conclusion that the
"continuing danger" exception was the basis for the court's holding:
[Illicit drugging] is so serious and the consequences so severe that absolute
protection to the horse and to the public is fully warranted . . . . The public is
entitled to protection from the continuing danger that one who participates in
drugging his horse will do so again . ...
513 F.2d at 244.
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emphasis on that element of the Goss decision may also explain why the
court did not consider other relevant Supreme Court cases.3 9
The Supreme Court in Goss did not attach such importance to the
exception. The holding in that case was based on a full consideration
of the competing interests, and the exception to the holding was the Court's
recognition that the result of the analysis would be different in cases
involving unusually disruptive students.40 The Court concluded that the
"continuing danger" posed by certain students was a variation in the facts
which would shift the balance of the interests in favor of the school administration's duty to maintain order. The exception was not posed as a separate
basis for analysis.
By explicitly recognizing that variations in facts could alter the result,
the Supreme Court in Goss reaffirmed the flexibility of its approach to
due process. The approach in Hubel allows little flexibility. It is arguable that an individual trainer of medicated horses might pose a danger
sufficient to justify his summary suspension, just as an individual student
might pose that degree of danger to a school community. But the Fourth
Circuit did not consider whether Richard Hubel himself posed a "continuing danger"; rather, it used the exception to conclude that, in general,
trainers of allegedly "doped" race horses may be summarily suspended.
The court removed the concepts which it had borrowed from Goss from
their context in a larger framework of analysis.
It should be noted that the court of appeals may have isolated a significant distinction between Goss and other Supreme Court cases. In most
of the decisions involving the issue posed in Hubel, the Supreme Court
has considered a particular procedure as it affected a particular property
right, and reached a general conclusion as to the timing of the notice and
the hearing. The Court in Goss went a step further: it recognized that
different facts might change the result even when the same procedure and
the same property right are involved. Although the controlling importance of facts has always been implicit in the Court's approach, the explicit
recognition of an exception to the holding in Goss is unusual. 41 But the
exception was posed as a short dictum, and the opinion as a whole does
not support the Fourth Circuit's use of the exception as a new basis
for decision.
The court in Hubel might have found support for its reasoning in
those decisions in which the Supreme Court concluded that suspension
39. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (termination of driver's
license necessary to holder's occupation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(termination of welfare benefits); cases discussed in text accompanying notes 43-47
infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
41. It is arguable, however, that there is similar explicit recognition of the controlling importance of individual facts in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), which the Supreme Court decided on the same day as
Goss. This case was the last of a confusing series of cases in the area of creditors'
remedies. Compare 34 MD. L. REv. 441 (1974), tvith 34 MD. L. RPv. 421 (1974).
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of a property right could precede notice and hearing. Most of those
cases have employed the traditional approach and concluded that summary government action was justified, because of an immediate need to
protect public safety or welfare.4 2 These decisions are precedent for the
result reached in Hubel, but they do not support the Fourth Circuit's
unusual analysis. However, there have been a few decisions, among them
Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy43 and Arnett v. Kennedy, 44 in

which the Supreme Court adopted an approach which indirectly supports
the method used to decide Hubel.
In Cafeteria Workers, the Supreme Court held that the government
was not required to grant a hearing when it terminated a civilian employee's position at a military base for security reasons. Although the
Court, in dicta, supported the general validity of the balancing test, 45
it held that employment in a military installation was a "mere privilege
subject to the Executive's plenary power,"' 48 and held that in such cases,
no hearing was required.
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the plurality in Arnett, a case which
reviewed procedures for termination of civil servants. In that opinion,
four justices agreed, in effect, that where the property right exists because
the government has granted it by statute, the government may, by the
terms of the statute, delimit the scope of the procedural due process
applicable to termination. The opinion implies that in such cases, no
separate constitutional due process protection attaches at all. 47
Both Cafeteria Workers and Arnett involved termination of the right
to earn a living in a chosen manner, an interest which the Supreme Court
has identified as worthy of judicial protection, 48 and the same interest
which was at stake in Hubel. Thus the Court has recognized that there
are situations in which the government's need for control over a property
right, which it has itself granted, is strong enough to justify summary
suspension procedures, even if the property right is an important one.
This appears to be the true import of the Hubel decision. Although the
court of appeals quoted language from Goss representing traditional due
process analysis, it focused primarily on the necessity of state regulation of
42. See, e.g., cases cited in note 32 supra.
43. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).

44. 416 U.S. 134 (1973).
45. 367 U.S. at 895.
46. Id.
47. 416 U.S. at 152-55. This position was strongly criticized in Justice Powell's
concurrence, 416 U.S. at 164, and in Justice White's dissent, 416 U.S. at 171. The
approach of the plurality in Arnett is present in the dissent in Goss, which was joined
in by four justices. 419 U.S. at 584. The fact that Justice Powell wrote the Goss
dissent indicates that he does not totally reject the approach. It is, therefore, arguable
that the Arnett plurality presented a new line of reasoning which may emerge as a
majority view. Cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 691
(1974) (White, J., concurring).
48. See note 15 supra.
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horse racing. Furthermore, this is what the Fourth Circuit seems to have
read into the "continuing danger" concept, which it considered to be an
expression of the overwhelming need for government regulation in certain
situations. This rationale finds support in Cafeteria Workers and Arnett,
but it is not present in the majority opinion in Goss.
The court of appeals was unquestionably correct in asserting that
there is a need for strict supervision of horse racing, and, specifically, that
the state has strong interests in preventing the "doping" of race horses.
It is indeed important to protect the horses from the potentially harmful
effects of the drugs, and to protect the interests of the racing public, which
has a right to expect that the races will be fairly run. It has long been
recognized that racing, which involves gambling, is very susceptible to
corruption. 49 The fact that the state collects significant revenues5" from
the sport adds to the state's involvement.5 1
But it is questionable whether the validity of the state's interests
should end the inquiry in the situation presented in Hubel. Regardless of
the ultimate conclusion, the traditional balancing-of-interests approach
provides for a more complete analysis which would include factors that
seem worthy of the court's attention. The most important of these is the
need of the trainer to earn his living. Despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has ruled that this interest may be summarily terminated in certain
situations, its importance is such that it should not be discounted except
in the most extreme circumstances. The court of appeals did not convincingly demonstrate that the need for regulation was so pressing that
the trainer's competing interests should be ignored.
Furthermore, the court's approach precluded consideration of the
manner in which the procedural system affected the trainer. Many of the
Supreme Court cases which have relied on the balancing test have carefully considered the effects of the procedures involved and have demonstrated precisely how those procedures serve the rights ultimately to be
protected. 52 The effect of the West Virginia Rules of Racing is harsh
49. Horse racing is really as much a matter of the skill of the jockey and of
the horse as it is of chance. There are, therefore, many ways in which the outcome
of a race can be unfairly altered; a jockey can be bribed to slow his horse down or
to use an electrical "prod," or, as allegedly occurred in Hubel, the horse can be
given a stimulant or a pain killer. See 3 J. HUMPHREYS & W. BASYE, RACING LAW
213 ff. (1973). See generally Poisson v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 5 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 20, 287 A2d 852 (1972) (judicial recognition of susceptibility of races
to manipulation).
50. In 1974, the State of Maryland collected $19,097,255.49 in revenues from
racing. 1974 REPORT OF THE MARYLAND RACING COMMISSION 5.
51. This is particularly true because the public would probably lose interest in
betting on the races if corruption were unchecked, causing a loss of much of the state
revenues. It was precisely this trend which led to the careful regulation of racing
around the turn of the century. 2 J. HUMPEREYS, RACING LAW 1 (1966).
52. Goss provides an example:
[W]e do not believe that we have imposed procedures on school disciplinarians
which are inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we have imposed require-
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indeed. The stewards are granted plenary power to suspend the permit
of an alleged offender, 58 and rule 80454 appears to require that no stay of
the stewards' decision be granted pending appeal. There is actually no
limit to the potential length of the suspension, because the Racing Commission has the authority to vote a continuance of the hearing.55 The rules
impose strict liability on the trainer,5 6 so that it is possible that a trainer
may suffer an indefinite suspension for an offense which he merely failed
to prevent.
The court of appeals also failed to consider whether the summary
suspension provisions actually advance the State's interests to a significant
degree. The fact that a horse has been drugged is usually determined
ments which are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions ....
... [R]equiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student
to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous
action. At least the disciplinarian will be alerted to the existence of disputes
about facts and arguments about cause and effect. . . [H]is discretion will be
more informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced.
419 U.S. at 583-84. Other Supreme Court opinions pay similar attention to the operation of the procedures and carefully consider their specific effects. North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615-20 (1974) ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 passim
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-69 (1970); Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414,
432-43 (1944).
53. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 802 (1972). The text
of the rule is given in note 5 supra.
54. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 804 (1972). The text
of the rule is given in note 7 supra.
55. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 805 (1972). The text
of the rule is given in note 6 supra.
56. W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, RR. 793 & 795(b) (1972).
The text of rule 793 is given in note 3 supra; the text of rule 795(b) is given in
note 4 supra.
A recent amendment to rule 795 reaffirmed the policy of strict liability for
drugging offenses:
It is the intent of the West Virginia Racing Commission to construe this rule most
strictly and any breach hereof, whether intentional or unintentional, shall be a
violation of this rule.
W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 795(A) (8) (1975), amending
W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, R. 795 (1973).
The constitutionality of West Virginia's strict liability rules was upheld in
State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 133 W. Va. 79, 55 S.E.2d 263
(1949). The states are split on the constitutionality of such rules. Compare Sandstrom
v. California Horse Racing Bd., 21 Cal. 2d 401, 189 P.2d 17, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814
(1948), with State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, 158 Fla. 165, 31 So. 2d 627 (1947). In
Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 48 A.2d 600 (1946), the Maryland Court of Appeals
struck down a Maryland rule imposiing strict liability on trainers. However, the Court
of Appeals later upheld a slightly different rule in Maryland Racing Comm'n v.
McGee, 212 Md. 69, 128 A.2d 419 (1957). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 206
(1974), and 3 J. HuMPiRaYS & W. BAYSE, RACING LAW 75 ff. (1973).
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only after the race has been run, 57 and after the immediate harm to the
horse and to the purity of the sport has been done. The rationale of the
rules therefore must lie in their deterrent effect. It seems appropriate to
consider whether the imposition of suspension before a hearing adds so
significantly to that effect as to justify summary termination of a trainer's
livelihood. If a trainer would not risk incurring summary suspension, it
seems no more likely that he would risk incurring notice of a hearing
which might result in his suspension. The fact that the rules impose strict
liability adds to the deterrent effect of the hearing itself, because few
defenses are available to the trainer. It would therefore seem that the
rules would provide an adequate deterrent even if a prior hearing were
to be granted.
The Fourth Circuit excluded consideration of these factors by adopting its exclusive emphasis on the importance of the state's concern for
regulation and the potential "continuing danger" to that interest posed by
any offender. Had it addressed the importance of the trainer's interest and
the effect of the procedures, the court's decision would have been more
convincing. The purpose of judicial inquiry in due process cases should
be to strike a balance between the individual's right and the government's
interest, and that purpose is best served by a broad focus. The validity of
the Supreme Court's balancing-of-interests approach as an analytical concept is derived to a large extent from its inclusiveness, for it assures that
the court will pay fair attention to all relevant factors. 8 The Fourth Circuit did not pose a preferable alternative in Hubel.
57. Infractions are determined by analysis of urine samples which are taken
after the race is over. See W. Va. Ad. Reg., Racing Comm'n ch. 19-23, ser. 1, RR.
793 & 795(b) (1972). Other methods of post-race testing are not regarded as reliable.
The reason that the urine tests are not performed before the race is, quite simply, that
it is impossible to induce a horse to give a sample shortly before a race. See generally
Kentucky State Racing Commn'n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1972) (Kentucky
Derby winner disqualified for drugging infraction); 3 J. HUmPHREYS & W. BASYE,
RAcING LAw 236 (1973).
58. Contra, Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1267 (1975).
See note 30 supra.

CRIMINAL LAW
UNLAWFUL

-

JURY VERDICTS CONVICTING

USE OF A HANDGUN

OF VIOLENCE WHILE ACQUITTING

UPHELD -

IN

DEFENDANT OF

THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME

HIM

OF ALL CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

Ford v. State.'

Defendant Ford was indicted on various charges arising from a taxicab
holdup. 2 At trial, he was acquitted of all specific robbery and assault
related charges, but was convicted of use of a handgun in the commission
of a felony or crime of violence in violation of Article 27, section 36B (d),
of the Maryland Code which provides:
Any person who shall use a handgun in the commission of any felony
or any crime of violence as defined in § 441 of this article, shall be
guilty of a separate misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall, in
addition to any other sentence imposed by virtue of commission of
said felony or misdemeanor, be sentenced to the Maryland Division
of Correction for a term of not less than five nor more than fifteen
years, and it is mandatory upon the court to impose no less than the
minimum sentence of five years.2
On appeal, Ford argued that the verdicts were rationally incompatible
and that the inconsistency in finding that he had used a handgun in the
commission of a felony or crime of violence while at the same time finding
that he was not guilty of any specific felony or crime of violence should
be grounds for reversing the conviction. He also claimed that the verdict
was invalid because it was apparent from statements made by the forelady
at a bench conference that the jury thought it was convicting the defendant
for mere possession of a handgun, a crime with which he had not been
charged. 4 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction.5 On
1. 274 Md. 546, 337 A.2d 81 (1975).
2. Indictment No. 17300103, (Criminal Court of Baltimore City, Jan. Term
1973), Judge Robert Watts presiding. The victim, Shaw, testified that after Ford and
Wilson (a co-defendant who did not seek review by the Court of Appeals) entered his
cab and stated their destination, Ford, holding a pistol, reached over to the front seat
and demanded Shaw's money. Shaw stopped the car; Ford and Wilson jumped out.
Wilson turned, pulled open the right front door and, also holding a pistol, demanded
Shaw's money. Shaw complied, but managed to speed away without being injured.
He radioed the police who arrested the defendants.
Ford and Wilson were indicted on eight counts. Four - attempted robbery with
a dangerous and deadly weapon, assault with intent to rob, larceny, and receiving
stolen goods - were dismissed by the trial judge on grant of defendants' motion for
acquittal. The other four counts were robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon,
robbery, assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of
violence. The jury acquitted on all but the last count.
3. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 36B(d) (Supp. 1974).
4. 274 Md. at 55--56, 337 A.2d at 86-87. See MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 36B (b)
(Supp. 1974).
5. Ford v. State, No. 628 (Ct. of Sp. App., filed April 8, 1974). The opinion
was delivered orally and is unreported. It is reprinted from the transcript in the
Record Extract to Brief for Appellant at E. 1, Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546, 337 A.2d
81 (1975).

536

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 35

certiorari the Court of Appeals held: (1) that section 36B(d) creates a
separate, distinct offense which need not be predicated upon a finding of
guilt on a separate charge of a felony or crime of violence; (2) that the
statements by the forelady could not be considered to impeach the jury's
verdict; and (3) that the inconsistency in the verdicts did not render the
conviction void.
Writing for the majority, Judge Digges conceded that a conviction
under section 36B(d) must be based on a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant used a handgun and did so while committing a
felony or crime of violence, but he held that it is "plain from the language
of section 36B(d) that the offense delineated in that statute is separate
and distinct from the felony or crime of violence during the commission
of which the handgun was used." Since the handgun offense is distinct,
the defendant could be charged and convicted under section 36B (d) without any accompanying conviction of a felony or crime of violence. On this
point, Judge O'Donnell, dissenting, disagreed, stating, "[T]he Legislature
clearly intended . . . that the section . . .is applicable only when a defend-

ant is also charged and convicted of committing such a 'felony' or one
of the enumerated 'crime[s] of violence.' " 1 It would follow from this
reading that the trial court was powerless to convict the defendant under
section 36B (d) after acquitting him on all other counts.
Neither opinion cites any prior judicial interpretation of the handgun law, yet the Court of Special Appeals had earlier ruled that section
36B(d) creates a separate and distinct offense. In Bremer v. States the
defendant contended that his convictions for assault with intent to murder
and for the handgun offense subjected him to double jeopardy. The Court
of Special Appeals stated, "[Blecause the crime created by section 36B(d)
is separate and distinct from the felony or crime of violence to which it
relates . . . there is no question of being twice put in jeopardy 'for the

same offense.' " Likewise, it ruled that the conviction for assault with intent to murder would not merge with the conviction under section 36B (d) .1
6. 274 Md. at 551, 337 A.2d at 84-85.
7. Id. at 564-65, 337 A.2d at 91-92.
8. 18 Md. App. 291, 307 A.2d 503 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974).
The defendant, Arthur Bremer, was convicted of crimes arising from his attempted
assassination of Alabama Governor George C. Wallace in May of 1972.
9. Id. at 313, 307 A.2d at 518.
10. Id. at 344-45, 307 A.2d at 534-35. In Green v. State, 243 Md. 75, 80, 220
A.2d 131, 135 (1966), the Court of Appeals said, "Most jurisdictions, including Maryland, have abolished the common law doctrine of merger and the true test under the
modern concept of merger of offenses, is whether one crime necessarily involves
the other." Because assault with intent to murder need not necessarily involve a handgun, the doctrine of merger was inapplicable in Bremer. White v. State, 23 Md. App.
151, 326 A.2d 219 (1974), reaffirms the merger holding in Bremer. In Hall v. State,
22 Md. App. 240, 243, 323 A.2d 435, 438 (1974), the court said that it was the legislature's "intent that the misdemeanor [section 36B(d)] be a 'separate' crime, and not
merely the occasion for imposing an additional sentence."
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An examination of another deadly weapon statute and its treatment
by courts in Maryland may lend further insight into the legislative intent
in enacting section 36B(d). Article 27, section 488, of the Maryland
Code deals with the crime of robbery with a deadly weapon" and provides for it a more severe sentence than for robbery committed without
the aggravating factor.' 2 The Court of Special Appeals has been consistent
in interpreting this section as not creating a substantive offense different
from robbery, but merely providing for a greater punishment when the
crime is committed with a dangerous or deadly weapon. 13 Had the legislature likewise intended that section 36B (d) provide only a greater penalty
for handgun offenses, it is arguable that wording similar to section 488
would have been chosen. Instead, the statute speaks of a "separate mis14
demeanor."'
Section 36B(d) was introduced to the Maryland Senate on January
17, 1972, as part of Senate Bill 205.15 Among the objectives stated in
the title of the bill was the purpose of making "the use of a handgun in
the commission of a felony or crime of violence a misdemeanor and to
provide penalties therefor."''
Again, the intent appears focused on the
creation of a new substantive crime.
One of the proposed amendments to the bill in the House of Delegates
was headed: "Stricter Sentences for Weapon Use in Commission of
Felony.' u7 This amendment, if adopted, would have exposed a defendant
to an extra term of sentence in addition to the punishment provided for
the commission of the underlying felony.' 8 Had the Legislature wanted
11. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 488 (1971) provides:
Every person convicted of the crime of robbery or attempt to rob with a dangerous or deadly weapon or accessory thereto, shall restore to the owner thereof the
thing robbed or taken, or shall pay him the full value thereof, and be sentenced to
imprisonment in the Maryland Penitentiary for not more than twenty years.
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 486 (1971), provides for a sentence of three to ten
years for robbery.
13. See, e.g., McCord v. State, 15 Md. App. 63, 289 A.2d 7 (1972); Darby v.
State, 3 Md. App. 407, 239 A2d 584 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969);
Jones v. State, 3 Md. App. 608, 240 A.2d 347 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 993 (1969).
14. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
15. Md. S.B. 205 (1972).
16. Id.
17. MD. H.D. JouR. 948 (1972). The amendment was to be numbered "643B"
and thus codified with other statutes relating to sentencing. The proposed House
amendment read as follows:
Whoever (a) uses a weapon to commit any felony for which he may be
prosecuted in a court of Maryland; or (b) carries a weapon unlawfully during the
commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of Maryland shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such
felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than eighteen months
nor more than five years ....
MD. H.D. JouR. 949 (1972).
1& Section 36B(d) as enacted provides for sentencing "in addition to any other
sentence imposed" for the commission of the felony or crime of violence (emphasis
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to provide only for sentencing in addition to that already received for
another crime, the amendment proposed in the House could have been
adopted; instead, it was defeated. 19 On March 17, 1972, a House amendment was introduced to strike section 36B(d) altogether. This too was
rejected.2 0 Therefore, although the legislative intent is perhaps not as
"plain from the language" as the majority in Ford would have us believe,
and despite the dearth of legislative history in the Maryland process and
the sparse information provided by the House and Senate Journals, there
remain persuasive indications that section 36B(d) was intended to create
a separate crime.
The majority also considered whether the court should disturb the
jury's verdict because it seemed, based on statements by the forelady, to
have resulted from a misunderstanding of the law.21 It concluded that
the forelady's statements indicated only that she was confused. Since
she was speaking out of hearing of the rest of the jury after the verdict
had been announced and recorded, she was held to be attempting to impeach the jury's verdict.2 2 Quoting an earlier case, the majority held,
"[It] is well settled that a juror cannot be heard to impeach his verdict,
whether the jury conduct objected to be misbehavior or mistake."'23 This
principle, known as the Mansfield rule, 24 is accepted in all but a few jurisdictions.2 5 The traditional rationale for the rule is that it is necessary to
keep jury deliberations secret in order to prevent subsequent harassment
of jurors, tampering with the verdict, fraud, corruption, and perjury, and
26
thus to insure confidence and finality to judicial proceedings.
Despite these meritorious considerations, the rule is troublesome in
criminal cases such as Ford in which the guilty verdict is clearly the result
of a mistake. The outcome might have been different, as Judge Digges
added). It is arguable that the choice of the word "any" in section 36B(d) as opposed
to the word "the" implies that there need not be a sentence imposed for the commission of a separate felony or crime of violence. This, at least, is Judge Digges' view
with which the majority of the Court of Appeals concurred. The court reasoned that
section 36B(d) provides for punishment in addition to the penalty already received,
"if any." 274 Md. at 551, 337 A.2d at 85.
19. MD. H.D. Joua. 949-50 (1972).
20. Id. at 1087.
21. The trial judge stated, "I think it's obvious they were trying to find them
guilty of just carrying a weapon." 274 Md. at 554, 337 A.2d at 86.
22. Id. at 555-56, 337 A.2d at 87.
23.
714, 720
field v.
(1864).

Id. at 556, 337 A.2d at 87, quoting Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 67, 102 A.2d
(1954) ; accord, Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 150 A.2d 918 (1959) ; BrinsHoweth, 110 Md. 520, 73 A. 289 (1909); Browne v. Browne, 22 Md. 103
See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2349-54 (McNaughton rev. 1961)

[hereinafter cited as

WIGMORE].

24. Lord Mansfield first stated the rule in Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944

,(K.B.1785).
25. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at § 2354.
26. See Johnson v. Davenport, 26 Ky. 390 (1830); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at
*§§ 2346, 2348. See generally Note, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L REv.
258 (1970).
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suggests, if the forelady's statements had been made within hearing of
the jury and the jurors adopted what the forelady revealed.27 It is supposed that in such an instance the risks of jury compromise are minimal.
The trial judge also could have refused to accept the verdict and required
the jury to retire to clarify its findings, 28 or he might have set aside the
verdict and granted a new trial. 29 However, once the jury is discharged,
the Mansfield rule applies, and the impeachment evidence cannot be considered in later proceedings. 80
In response to Ford's contention that the verdict was so inconsistent,
repugnant, or absurd as to render it meaningless, the majority cited the
leading Maryland cases on inconsistent verdicts 3 and the leading Supreme
Court case, Dunn v. United States,8 2 in which Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an
indictment is regarded as if it was [sic] a separate indictment .
That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a
mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be
upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.88
27. 274 Md. at 555 n.5, 337 A2d at 87 n.5.
28. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 23, at § 2350.
29. Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 384, 183 A.2d 359, 365 (1962), appeal dismissed,
372 U.S. 767 (1963).
30. 8 WIGMOPX, supra note 23, at § 2350. For further discussion of impeachment
of jury verdicts see Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts by Jurors: A Proposa
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 388 and 47 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1947).
31. It can be argued that each of the Maryland cases on verdict inconsistency
cited by the majority involve no material inconsistency. For instance, in Leet v.
State, 203 Md. 285, 100 A.2d 789 (1953), the defendant's conviction for willful failure
to file a state income tax return and his acquittal for willful failure to pay the tax
can be reconciled since the jury might have believed that the failure to file was willful
but the failure to pay was not. The court in fact found that there was no inconsistency,
but held that even if there were, the conviction could stand. In Williams v. State,
204 Md. 55, 102 A.2d 714 (1954), the court held that there was no inconsistency involved when the defendants were convicted of assaulting a police officer after a charge
of disorderly conduct had been stetted. As in Leet, the court went on to say that even
if the findings were inconsistent, the conviction would stand as long as it was supported by the evidence. In Ledbetter v. State, 224 Md. 271, 167 A.2d 596 (1961), the
defendant, participated in a street mugging and was convicted of murder but acquitted
of robbery. The court pointed out that although the verdicts were inconsistent, the
jury might have believed that the defendant failed in his attempt to commit the robbery for which he was acquitted, but was nevertheless vicariously liable for the murder
committed by his companions in that attempt. In Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528, 209
A.2d 765 (1965), the court held that the dismissal of a lesser included offense (assault)
might not be inconsistent with jury convictions of greater offenses (rape and kidnapping) when the trial judge specifically stated that the dismissal was not to be
construed as a finding of insufficient evidence for the greater offenses.
32. 284 U.S. 390 (1932) (Holmes, J.). Defendant was acquitted of unlawful
sale and possession of liquor but convicted of maintaining a common nuisance by keeping intoxicating liquor for sale.
33. Id. at 393-94.
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It follows from an application of this rationale to the facts in Ford v. State
that as long as there is sufficient evidence for the jury to believe that a
handgun was used in the commission of a crime of violence, the conviction
under section 36B (d) will remain unaffected by an acquittal on any other
count. The Dunn rule made it clear that such inconsistency would be of
no consequence.
Although the Dunn case has been widely followed and its holding
on inconsistent verdicts is regarded as the majority rule, 34 its rationale, as
Judge O'Donnell points out in his dissent, has been seriously challenged.
Part of the basis of Dunn is a res judicata argument: if separate indictments had been brought against the defendant, an acquittal on one could
not have been pleaded as res judicata against another.3 5 This, however,
is no longer the law. The Supreme Court more recently has stated in
Sealfon v. United States,36 "[R]es judicata may be a defense in a second
9
prosecution. 8' 7 In Ashe v. Swenson38 and in Simpson v. Florida"
the
Supreme Court held that relitigation of issues resolved at a prior trial was
barred due to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 40 The question raised by
the dissent is whether these cases thoroughly undermine Dunn and leave
the principal authority on inconsistent verdicts without a reasoned basis
4
of support. '
34. Most jurisdictions, following Dunn, take the view that verdicts acquitting on
some counts and convicting on others need not be consistent However, a minority of
jurisdictions have held verdicts to be reversible if inconsistent Some courts have
ruled both ways. Compare People v. Ranney, 123 Cal. App. 403, 11 P.2d 405 (1932)
(holding that inconsistent conviction and acquittal on different counts were immaterial so long as the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction), with People
v. Tophia, 167 Cal. App. 2d 39, 334 P.2d 133 (1959) (suggesting that a conviction
accompanied by an inconsistent acquittal might be reversed if there were a real factual
inconsistency in the findings). Arizona now follows the majority rule after expressly
overruling State v. Fling, 69 Ariz. 94, 210 P.2d 221 (1949), and State v. Laney, 78
Ariz. 19, 274 P.2d 838 (1954), in State v. Zakhar, 105 Ariz. 31, 459 P.2d 83 (1969).
Alaska, however, never before having ruled on inconsistent verdicts, decided to follow
the minority rule in DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369 (Alas. 1970). Several states, in
order to avoid taking a position on the question, have sought to construe apparently
inconsistent verdicts as consistent, e.g., State v. Duck, 210 S.C. 94, 41 S.E.2d 628 (1947).
For more thorough analysis of the nationwide treatment of inconsistent verdicts see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 259 (1968), and Comment, Inconsistent Verdicts in a
Federal Criminal Trial, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 999, 1002 n.18 (1960).
35. 284 U.S. at 393.
36. 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
37. Id. at 578.
38. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
39. 403 U.S. 384 (1971).
40. See also United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Yawn v. United
States, 244 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Curzio, 170 F2d 354 (3d Cir.
1948); United States v. Cowart, 118 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1954).
41. It should be noted that Sealfon involved only federal law and its ruling that
res judicata may be a defense in a subsequent prosecution is not binding upon the
states. However, in Ashe the Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is part of due process and thus must be observed by the states. Hence, the
effect of Ashe is to further undermine the res judicata argument in Dunn. For a
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Even discarding Holmes' res judicata argument, 42 the Dunn rule
appears to survive because there was in Dunn an additional basis for the
decision. Quoting Steckler v. United States,43 Holmes stated:
The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows
that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak
their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more
than their assumption of a power which they had4 4no right to exercise,
but to which they were disposed through lenity.
In this respect, the Dunn rule has a reasonable foundation, and that case
now stands for the principle that the jury should be afforded broad powers
to arrive at inconsistent verdicts of acquittal and conviction through its
traditional power to compromise, whether motivated by leniency or other
considerations.4"
Not all jurisdictions have followed Dunn, and there is a respectable
minority which has held that inconsistent verdicts may be reversed. 46
Judge O'Donnell examined the treatment of inconsistent verdicts in states
which have not followed Dunn. For the most part, there may be a reversal
when an acquittal on one count negates an essential element of the crime
for which the defendant is convicted on another.4 7 Other cases allow
reversal when the acquittal and conviction cannot be logically reconciled 4
or when the evidence supporting the acquittal and conviction are identical. 49
There is a separate line of authority holding that a judge sitting
without a jury may not render inconsistent verdicts. 50 The reasons given
further discussion of the effect of Ashe on inconsistent verdicts see Comment, Ashe
v. Swenson: Collateral Estoppel, Double Jeopardy, and Inconsistent Verdicts, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1971). See also Bickel, Judge and fury - Inconsistent Verdicts
in the Federal Courts, 63 HAV. L. REv. 649 (1950); Comment, Inconsistent Verdicts
in a Federal Criminal Trial, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 999 (1960).
42. The argument may have lacked merit when Holmes made it. Sixteen years
earlier in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), Holmes stated that res
judicata could be a defense in a second prosecution.
It is interesting to note that Holmes was ninety years of age when he wrote
the Dunn decision. In a letter dated a week before the case was decided, Holmes
wrote, "I have not been very well and I find it difficult to write; difficult physically
and mentally." Holmes resigned the day after his decision in Dunn was handed down.
THE HOLMEs-EI NSTEIN LETTERs 335 (J.B. Peabody ed. 1964).
43. 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.).
44. 284 U.S. at 393.
45. United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1967); United States
v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1960); Bickel, Judge and Jury - Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 H.Av. L. REv. 649, 651 (1950).
46. See note 34 supra.
47. See Annot., 18 A.L.L3d 259, 282 (1968).
48. See id. at 281.
49. See id. at 283.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960); Johnson
v. State, 238 Md. 528, 209 A.2d 765 (1965) (apparently recognizing the rule, see
note 31 supra).
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are that a judge sitting as trier of fact has no problem in reaching a unanimous decision, and, unlike the jury, he can exercise leniency in passing
sentence. Furthermore, it is almost universally held that inconsistent
verdicts of guilty are a ground for reversal. 5 '
The fundamental difference between the majority and minority rules
on inconsistent verdicts is that the former accords the jury a maximum
degree of latitude while the latter requires the jury's findings to be logically
reconcilable. The majority rule results in greater finality to the jury verdict at the expense of upholding irrational findings of fact, and enables the
jury, in some instances, to protect the defendant from a harsh application
of the law. The minority rule maintains a standard of common sense, but
gives rise to some troublesome procedural and constitutional questions.
For example, if a conviction is reversed because of its inconsistency with
an acquittal at the same trial, retrial might be prevented by considerations
of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel. Some courts have held that
although the acquittal cannot be retried, neither can it be used collaterally
to estop reprosecution of the reversed conviction. 52 This approach runs
contrary to the rule in Ashe v. Swenson, which bars relitigation of issues
resolved at a prior trial, and it is therefore of doubtful constitutionality.
In conclusion, Ford v. State is a reaffirmation of the doctrine of inviolability of the jury verdict and of Maryland's stand in following the
majority rule on inconsistent verdicts. The court did not find persuasive
the appellant's argument that the acquittals indicated a lack of evidence
to support the conviction under section 36B (d). Because the acquittals may
have been the result of leniency, they need not be interpreted as negating
an essential element of the handgun offense.
However, the question remains whether there can be any justification
for permitting intrinsically inconsistent jury verdicts to stand when it is
apparent that the verdicts were the result of a mistake, and not of the jury's
historic power to treat defendants leniently. 53 By opting for a rigid rule
upholding all such inconsistent verdicts, regardless of the cause, the majority has apparently lost sight of the reason for the rule itself.
51. See Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 42 A.2d 128 (1945); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d
259, 283-84 (1968).
52. United States v. Maybury, 274 F2d 899 (2d Cir. 1960); DeSacia v. State,
469 P2d 369 (Alas. 1970).
53. This power is explicitly given to the jury in Maryland by article XV, section
5, of the Maryland Constitution, which makes the jury judge of the law as well as the
facts in a criminal case, but allows the court to pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a conviction.
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County Council

v. Montgomery Association, Inc.'
In County Council v. Montgomery Association, Inc., the Court of
Appeals held three Montgomery County election ordinances invalid because state legislation impliedly preempted the field 2 with which they dealt.
The ordinances regulated campaign finances in primary and general elections for county council and county executive. 3 The court found that the
state Election Code 4 occupied this area of the law and for the first time
used the doctrine of implied preemption to preclude local action.
The case on appeal presented four issues: (1) whether the state Election Code completely occupied the field of campaign finance, implementing
a legislative intent to exclude local legislation; (2) whether the Montgomery County Council, under its charter 5 and the Express Powers Act, 6
otherwise had the authority to enact the election ordinances ;7 (3) whether
the ordinances actually conflicted with the state Election Code;8 and (4)
1. 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975).
2. For a definition of field see note 13 infra.
3. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 16, §§ 16-17 to 16-21 (1972); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 2, § 2-129 (1972); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE
ch. 16, § 16-20 (1927). These ordinances, approved in July, 1974, required disclosure
of the names and addresses of contributors of $25 or more to candidates for County
Executive or County Council; limited expenditures by candidates and by political
committees, slates, and groups of candidates on the basis of stated amounts per voter;
limited contributions from individuals, including candidates themselves; prohibited
contributions from corporations organized for profit; and provided penalties for
certain violations.
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33 (Supp. 1974), as amended, MD. ANN. CODE art 33
(Supp. 1975)
5. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE art. 1, part I (1972).
6. MD. ANN. CODE art 25A (1973), as amended, MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A
(Supp. 1975).
7. See note 27 infra.
8. The lower court saw a possible conflict in the area of corporate contributions
and contributions by candidates. The court here, while not deciding the conflict issue,
does note as significant the fact that each county ordinance corresponds to a section
or sections of the state code. 274 Md. at 63-64, 333 A.2d at 602. In general, each ordinance provision is at least as stringent as its statutory counterpart or more so. In
such a situation the courts have often held an ordinance valid. Mayor & City Council
v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969) ; Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 A.
581 (1909). On the other hand, however, it may be argued that each prohibits something that the state statute permits. This is particularly cogent with respect to corporate contributions. Compare MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 16, § 16-19
(1972), with MD. ANN. CODE art 33, § 26-9(b) (Supp. 1974), as amended, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 33, § 26-9(b) (Supp. 1957). See also MD. ANN. CODE art 33, §§ 26, 29-31
(Supp. 1974), as amended, MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 26, 29-31 (Supp. 1975).
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whether the ordinances violated the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.9 After deciding the first issue affirmatively, the court
declined to deal with the other three.'0
The majority marshalled three arguments in support of its decision.
First, in the General Assembly's constitutional power" to enact laws to
preserve the purity of elections and to regulate all matters relating to holding elections and to election returns, the majority found a mandate for
state control of elections. The court identified a constitutional intent that
the field of elections, and a fortiori election finances, would be the province
and impliedly the exclusive province of the state legislature. 12 By enacting
a comprehensive state Election Code, the General Assembly, in the court's
opinion, complied with this directive.
3
Second, the majority inferred a legislative intent to preempt the field'
of election regulation on both state and local levels from the extensiveness
of the state Election Code. In particular, the court drew attention to the
supervisory powers and duties of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws and to the detailed provisions of the statute on campaign financing and spending. 14 The Board is charged to "make an annual report to
9. 274 Md. at 57, 333 A.2d at 599. Two fourteenth amendment issues were raised:
(1) whether corporations are "persons" having first amendment rights of freedom of
expression under the equal protection and due process clauses; and (2) whether the
ordinances were unconstitutionally vague. For general treatment of fourteenth
amendment and statute-ordinance conflicts see 4 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW - COUNTY LAW § 31.07, at 24-26 (1966); for a discussion of judicial limitations
on police power to protect basic constitutional rights such as free speech and due
process through application of the preemption doctrine see Blease, Cizil Liberties and
the California Law of Preemption, 17 HASTINGs L.J. 517 (1965-66) [hereinafter cited
as Blease].
10. The case could have been decided on concurrent power and conflict grounds
and its disposition, whether affirmation or dismissal, would have some support on
the facts. See notes 5-9 supra. By basing their decision on implied preemption by
occupation, the court seems to have deliberately introduced a new theory into Maryland case law.
11. Mn. CONST. art III, §§ 42, 49.
12. 274 Md. at 60, 333 A.2d at 600-01.
13. A field was defined in Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 862, 452 P.2d
930, 937, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 649 (1969), as "an area of legislation which includes the
subject of the local legislation, and is sufficiently logically related so that a court,
or a local legislative body, can detect a patterned approach to the subject .... A field
cannot properly consist of statutes unified by a single common noun." See, e.g., County
Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, Inc., 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975) (campaign
finances) ; In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962) (sexual
activities) ; Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952) (loyalty oaths) ;
Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942) (conduct of pedestrians under
state vehicle code); Mayor & City Council v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376
(1969); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 17 App. Div.
2d 327, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 998, 189 N.E2d 623, 239 N.Y.S.2d
128 (1963) (minimum wage law).
14. 274 Md. at 61-63, 333 A.2d at 601-02. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 26,
29-31 (Supp. 1974), as amended, MD. ANN. CODE art 33, §§ 26, 29-31 (Supp. 1975).
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the General Assembly including recommended changes . . .to assure ...
uniform administration"'15 of the Election Code in both state and local
elections. Courts in other jurisdictions which employ preemption theory
have relied on the breadth and detail of state legislation,16 as reflected by an
analysis of the statute itself and the facts and circumstances upon which it is
intended to operate, 17 to evidence legislative intent to preempt the field.' 8
Third, preemption of the field by the state legislation was supported
by the need for statewide uniformity. Although the Maryland Constitution 19 and the Express Powers Act 20 give charter counties certain enumerated powers, as well as the power to pass "such ordinances as may be
deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and
welfare of the county," 2' the constitution also limits these powers: in any
conflict between local law and any public general law, the public general
law shall control.2 2 Baltimore City has similar powers and is subject to
similar limitations. 28 In further limiting the power of Montgomery County,
the court foresaw that confusion and duplication of effort might result
24
from simultaneous operation of two regulatory schemes.
Traditionally, Maryland courts predicate decisions 25 to validate or
invalidate local ordinances 26 upon concurrent power and conflict theories.
These two theories are conceptually distinct. The concurrent power theory
asks whether the local government has been delegated legislative power
in a field where the state also has power to legislate. 27 The conflict test
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 1A-1 (e) (4) (Supp. 1974), as amended, MD. ANN.
art. 33, § 1A-1(e)(4) (Supp. 1975).
16. Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARv.
L. REv. 737, 746 (1959).
17. See In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 110, 372 P.2d 897, 903, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863
(1962) (concurring opinion) ; Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280,
283 (1952) ; Eastlick v. Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 666, 177 P.2d 558, 562 (1947).
CODE

18. See Robin v. Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 350, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1972) ;
Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280, 283 (1952); Blease, note 9
supra, at 530; Comment, The California City versus Preemption by Implication, 17
HASTINGS

L.J. 603, 606 (1966).

19. MD.CONST. art. XI-A, §§ 2, 3.
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A (1973),
(Supp. 1975).

21.

MD. ANN. CODE art.

as amended,

MD. ANN.

CODE art. 25A

25A, § 5(S) (1973).

22. MD.CONST. art.XI-A, § 3.
23. MD.CONST. art. XI, art. XI-A, and Md. Pub. Local L. art. 4, § 6.
24. 274 Md. at 64, 333 A.2d at 602.
25. See, e.g., County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312 A2d
225 (1973) ; American Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Mayor & City COuncil, 245 Md. 23,
224 A.2d 883 (1966). See generally 4 C. ANTIEAU, LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW COUNTY LAW § 31.09 (1966); 6 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 21.33 to 21.34 (3d ed. 1969).
26. Because the Montgomery Association court limits its discussion to counties
and Baltimore City, this recent decision does not deal with Municipal Corporations

under

MD. CONST.

art. XI-E.

27. In application, the concurrent powers doctrine asks several questions: whether
the state has expressly reserved a given field for itself; whether the delegation of the
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then asks whether the ordinance, enacted under local concurrent powers
and otherwise valid, conflicts with state law in the field.
Maryland case law on concurrent power and conflict theories began
with Rossberg v. State,2 where the court held that Baltimore City had
concurrent power with the state to punish the sale or possession of cocaine,
and the fact that the ordinance was broader in scope than the statute and
assigned additional penalties did not create a conflict. The court stated:
[M]unicipal authorities may be given concurrent power with the
State to punish certain classes of offenses ....
The true doctrine .... .

. "[that local] ordinances must

not directly or indirectly contravene the general law. Hence ordinances which assume directly or indirectly to permit acts or occupapower has been "prohibited by express constitutional or statutory provisions," Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 414, 74 A. 581, 583 (1909); whether the legislature has
conferred upon the county or city express power to legislate in a given field; and
whether the county or city may derive legislative authority from the implied powers
contained in a general welfare or police powers clause of its charter.
In Montgomery Association, the court could have invalidated the ordinances
on the theory that the county had no power to legislate on campaign finances. This
position might have rested on the Maryland constitutional provisions in article III,
§§ 42, 49. These sections were interpreted by the Montgomery Association court
as a "constitutional directive" to the General Assembly to enact comprehensive state
election laws. 274 Md. at 60, 333 A.2d at 601. Alternatively, these provisions could
be interpreted as a prohibition by "express constitutional . . .provision" from delegating to the counties or the city the power to legislate in the field. Rossberg v. State,
111 Md. 394, 414, 74 A. 581, 583 (1909). This argument is buttressed by MD. ANN.
CODE art. 25A, § 5(Q) (1973), which empowers the charter county, "[t]o provide for the appointment and removal of all county officers except those whose
appointment or election is provided for by the Constitution or public general law . . ."

(emphasis added). Three factors suggest that local electkns are within the exception
to section 5(Q). Article 33 generally includes federal, state, local and party elections.
The Maryland Constitution, article XI-A, requires that each charter county shall have
a county council and, if the charter so provides, a chief executive officer. Article XVII
of the Maryland Constitution deals with quadrennial elections for all state and county
officers elected by qualified voters. But see MD.ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(S) (1973) :
The foregoing or other enumeration of powers in this article shall not be held to
limit the power of the county council, in addition thereto, to pass all ordinances,
resolutions or bylaws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this article or the
laws of the State, as may be proper in executing and enforcing any of the powers
enumerated in this section or elsewhere in this article, as well as such ordinances
as may be deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health
and welfare of the county . . . to the extent that the same are not provided for
by public general law . . . ." (emphasis added).

This general welfare clause, the Montgomery County Charter provisions in article 1,
§§ 101-02 (1972) and article 2, §§ 201-03 (1972), which provide for election of a
county council and executive by the qualified voters of the entire county, and a narrow
reading of Maryland Constitution article XI-A, § 3, which states that each charter
"shall provide for" a county council and, if desired, a county chief executive officer,
suggest that a strong counter argument may be made.
28. 111 Md. 394, 74 A. 581 (1909).
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tions which the State statutes prohibit, or to prohibit acts permitted
by statute or Constitution, are . . . uniformly declared to be null and
''
void. Additional regulation by the ordinance does not render it void."
Rossberg established the concurrent power of the municipalities, stated
that the statute prevails where a statute and an ordinance conflict, and set
a standard for judging whether an inconsistency exists. 30 This rule has
also been applied to ordinance-statute conflicts in chartered counties. 8 '
Subsequent decisions clarified Rossberg. An ordinance that enlarges
upon the statutory provisions by requiring more than the statute was
held to create no conflictA2 A finding of concurrent power established a
presumption that the ordinance was valid. 33 A local ordinance enacted
under an expressly granted power took priority over a public general
law3 4 just as would a public local law.8 5 In the absence of express prohibitions of local regulation, supplemental regulation which prescribed
more stringent requirements for local peculiarities and which furthered
the statutory purposes was allowed. 6
29. Id. at 415-17, 74 A. at 584.
30. In Heubeck v. Mayor & City Council, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954) and
in Levering v. Park Comm'rs, 134 Md. 48, 106 A. 176 (1919), the Maryland Court of
Appeals quoted and applied the Rossberg test to an ordinance prohibiting a landlord
from evicting a holdover tenant where such eviction had been sanctioned by state
statute and to an ordinance and a regulation conflicting with state "blue laws."
31. E.g., County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225
(1973), where the court found that several sections of the Montgomery County Fair
Landlord-Tenant Relations Act conflicted with state provisions in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 21 (1973).
32. Eastern Tar Prods. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Md. 290, 296-97, 4
A.2d 462, 464 (1939). The court in Eastern Tar Products upheld a local ordinance
which exempted from municipal taxation all personal property used in connection with
manufacturing, provided that timely application was made. The ordinance was not
voided by the state Tax Revision Act which provided for state, county and city tax
exemption of such property in any county or Baltimore City where it was or might be
exempt from city or county taxation, nor was it in conflict with a local law provision
setting a different time for application.
33. Id. at 297, 4 A.2d at 464-65.
34. Herman v. Mayor & City Council, 189 Md. 191, 195-96, 55 A2d 491, 494
(1947). In Herman, the court upheld a Baltimore City excise tax on alcoholic beverages at the retail level. Since it was enacted under emergency general taxing powers
conferred by the state legislature, the City ordinance prevailed over a Maryland
Alcoholic Beverages Law provision prohibiting city imposition of license fees or taxes
upon alcoholic beverages, other than the usual property tax. For a general discussion
of local legislation under express grants of power see 4 C. ANTIEAU, LOCAL GovERNMENT LAW COUNTY LAW § 31.09 (1966); 6 E. McQuILLIN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 21.33 (3d ed. 1969).

35. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
36. For a discussion of supplemental regulation see notes 42, 43 & 47 infra. The
County Council in the instant case did not argue local peculiarity. This is often the
strongest policy argument favoring validation of an ordinance. For a discussion of
concurrent powers as applied in Maryland and proposed shared powers plan see
Moser, County Home Rule - Sharing the State's Legislative Power with Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. Rxv. 327 (1968).
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Preemption is first mentioned affirmatively in Mayor & City Council
v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co.,37 where the court invalidated a city bail
bond licensing ordinance which conflicted with express provisions of the
state law.3 8 Implied preemption arguments were often raised by counsel,
but the court refused to invalidate an ordinance on that basis.3 9 Then
Mayor & City Council v. Sitnick,40 while rejecting implied preemption
on the facts, announced "that there may be times when the legislature
may so forcibly express its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation
that the acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emption by occupation is com'41
pelled, but we do not find it in this case."
Sitnick upheld Baltimore's local minimum wage ordinance on traditional concurrent power grounds ;42 however, its invitation to use the implied preemption doctrine was accepted in Montgomery Association.4 3
There are three circumstances in which otherwise valid local ordinances
become invalid: (1) if they conflict with the public general laws; (2) if
they deal with a field which the state legislature has expressly preempted:
or (3) if they infringe upon an area where the state legislature has acted
so forcefully that the intention to occupy the entire field is necessarily
implied. Montgomery Association is the first case to invalidate a Maryland ordinance under the implied preemption by occupation doctrine. The
majority expressly rejected the contention that there was any inconsistency
between the Rossberg line of cases and the implied preemption theory of
the instant case." This position is supported by the case law in other
jurisdictions where implied preemption has been applied. 45 Preemption
37. 226 Md. 379, 174 A.2d 153 (1961).
38. Id. at 387-90, 174 A.2d at 157-58. The ordinance required a city license in
order to operate in the city although the state license authorized statewide operations.
39. E.g., American Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Mayor & City Council, 245 Md.

23, 30-34, 224 A.2d 883, 886-88 (1966).
40. 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969). The Sitnick court upheld the Baltimore
City Minimum Wage Ordinance, which set a higher minimum wage than that required
by state law, and included taverns in its application while the state law exempted them.
41. Id. at 323, 255 A.2d at 385.
42. The Sitnick court said:
[A] political subdivision ... may prohibit what the State has not expressly permitted. Stated another way, unless a general public law contains an express denial
of the right to act by local authority, the State's prohibition of certain activity
in a field does not impliedly guarantee that all other activity shall be free from
local regulation and in such a situation the same field may thus be opened to
supplemental local regulation. (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 317, 255 A.2d at 382.
43. 274 Md. at 59-60, 333 A.2d at 600.
44. Id. at 65, 333 A.2d at 603.
45. The three theories coexist in Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 859,
866, 452 P.2d 930, 935, 940, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647, 652 (1969), where the state and
the city had concurrent powers to legislate on gun control, but the validity of the
city ordinance was challenged on preemption and conflict -theories. The ordinance
was held valid. On the other hand, in Kim v. Orangetown, 66 Misc. 2d 364, 367-70,
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theory may be viewed as conflict theory on a different plane. It involves a
conflict between "the legislative intent to regulate an area and the very
act of local legislation in conflict with this legislative intent" ;46 where the
state has preempted a field, an ordinance in that field ipso facto conflicts.
Adoption of the implied preemption doctrine requires ordinances to
withstand an additional test: Do the state statute's scope and exhaustiveness, its constitutional origin, and its general policy considerations preclude local legislation ?

47

The Montgomery Association dissent saw no variation in the force
with which the state legislature occupied the field of election law and
that of minimum wage law as seen in Sitnick. Under a comprehensiveness
321 N.Y.S.2d 724, 729-31 (1971), the validity of an abortion ordinance was challenged on both conflict and preemption theories and held invalid on each ground.
46. Feiler, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments - The Doctrine of
Implied Preemption, 2 URBAN LAw. 398, 404 (1970).
47. For example, in Robin v. Hempstead, a case involving the places where an
abortion may be performed, the court in finding state preemption of the field took
into account the need for "the protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants
of the state." 30 N.Y.2d 347, 350, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1972). The need for
statewide uniformity in the treatment of a subject may be a consideration. In re Lane,
58 Cal. 2d 99, 111, 372 P.2d 897, 904, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 864 (1962) (concurring
opinion) ; Blease, note 9 supra at 546-48, 551. The threat of double jeopardy where
a criminal ordinance duplicates a statute has been instrumental in the invalidation of
the ordinance. See Note, Pre-Emption by State Over Penal Ordinances, 38 N.D. L.
REv. 509, 512-13 (1962). The court in Galvan v. Superior Court suggested as a test
whether "'the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient
citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipality.'" 70 Cal. 2d
851, 860, 452 P.2d 930, 936, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 648 (1969). The Galvan court also
mentioned two other tests, that "'the subject matter has been so fully and completely
covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter
of state concern; [or that] the subject matter has been partially covered by general
law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will
not tolerate further or additional local action .

. . .'"

Id. at 859-60, 452 P.2d at 935,

76 Cal. Rptr. at 647. The former seems to reword the comprehensiveness factor
previously mentioned, while the latter resembles the rule for express preemption. It
should be noted that, while the Galvan court applied these as tests for preemption of
a field, they first appeared in In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 814-15,
41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1964), where the issue was whether a particular subject was a
statewide or a municipal affair. See also Bishop v. San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 63, 460
P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469 (1969) :
[T]he fact, standing alone, that the Legislature has attempted to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative of the issue as between
state and municipal affairs, nor does it impair the constitutional authority of a
home rule city or county to enact and enforce its own regulations to the exclusion
of general laws if the subject is held by the courts to be a municipal affair . .. ;
stated otherwise, the Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern.
Footnote 6 stated, "Any statements to the contrary found in In re Hubbard . . .
were not only unnecessary to the decision there but are overruled if they be deemed
authoritative." (citations omitted).
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test, this is perhaps true. 48 Comprehensiveness, however, is only one
determinant of whether a field has been preempted by occupation. The
timing of state and local actions can strongly suggest that the legislature
saw no conflict, and it can weaken the inference of legislative intent to
preempt the field. In Sitnick, for example, the city law was enacted prior
to the state statute, yet the statute did not repeal it. In Montgomery
Association, however, the ordinances were enacted subsequent to the
statute. Another factor to be considered is identifiable local differences;
the variation in the cost of living from one area to the next, particularly
from rural to urban sections, strongly supports Sitnick's validation of
supplemental wage legislation tailored to Baltimore City.
In selecting the campaign finances case to introduce implied preemption by occupation into Maryland law, the court chose a particularly strong
case from the standpoint of policy considerations, statutory construction
and constitutional mandate. The peculiarly political and governmental
nature of campaign finances, the need for clear guidelines on the subject,
and the comprehensiveness of the state Election Code made the present
case appropriate for Maryland's first application of the doctrine of implied
preemption.4 9 In Montgomery Association, the election ordinances were
held invalid in the absence of express preemption, of direct conflict with
the state statute, and of a determination of local legislative power. Implied
preemption alone was used to invalidate the county ordinances regulating
local election finances.
Because the criteria used to infer legislative intent to occupy a field
are inexact and because the court did not dwell upon its reasons for relying on preemption rather than the traditional theories, preemption gives
Maryland courts great flexibility in analyzing an ordinance's validity. Montgomery Association suggests that implied preemption by occupation, rather
than the concurrent powers and conflict theories, will be applied in Maryland when two factors appear. First, comprehensive state legislation in the
48. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 33 (Supp. 1974), as amended, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 33 (Supp. 1975), with MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §§ 81-93 (1964), as amended,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §§ 81-93 (Supp. 1975).
49. The doctrine of implied preemption by occupation is used in several other
jurisdictions including New York, Pennsylvania, and California where it has its
fullest development and application. See E. McQuILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 21.30 (3d ed. 1969); Dalzell, The State Preemption Doctrine:
Lessons from the Pennsylvania Experience, 33 U. PITT. L. REv. 205 (1971) ; Note,
Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REv. 737
(1959) ; Comment, The State v. The City: A Study in Preemption, 36 S. CAL. L. REV.
430 (1963); Comment, Municipal Home Rule in New York, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
736 (1971); Comment, The California Preemption Doctrine: Expanding the Regulatory Power of Local Governments, 8 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 728 (1974). To study
the development of the theory in New York see People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 64
N.E.2d 702 (1945); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 17
App. Div. 2d 327, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1962), aft'd, 12 N.Y.2d 998, 239 N.Y.S.2d 128,
189 N.E.2d 623 (1963); Kim v. Orangetown, 66 Misc. 2d 364, 321 N.Y.S.2d 724
(1971); and Robin v. Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972).
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field is necessary but not sufficient to establish preemption. In Sitnick, for
example, the state had enacted comprehensive minimum wage laws, yet
the preemption doctrine was not applied. Second, strong policy arguments
must favor state preemption of the field. The court drew attention to the
detailed state Election Code; to the tradition of state control of elections,
unlike the local control traditional in Sitnick's minimum wage law and
Rossberg's penal provisions; and to the interference by local control with
general electoral process in which finances of candidates, tickets and parties interact on both state and local levels.
The effect of the doctrine of implied preemption by occupation on
Maryland law is yet to be determined. Frequent judicial application could
lead to diminished responsiveness to local needs and to uncertainty in
home rule subdivisions because preemption, unlike the concurrent power
or conflict theories, closes the entire legislative field involved to local
action. It could curb home rule power. On the other hand, cautious use of
the doctrine could prevent confusion arising from dual regulation. Further,
the foundations of preemption in Maryland cases are solid, and retreat
from the preemption doctrine is not likely. Its wise application requires
a balancing of peculiar municipal needs against the general benefits of
uniform statewide treatment.50
50. See Comment, The California City versus Preemption by Implication, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 603, 614 (1966).

